In 1996, Krivine applied Friedman's A-translation in order to get a constructive version of Gödel Completeness result for first order classical logic. Such result is known to be intuitionistically underivable, but Krivine managed to constructively derive a weak form of it. In this paper, we want to analyze the ideas Krivine's remarkable result relies on, ideas which where somehow hidden by the heavy formal machinery used in the original proof. We show that the ideas in Krivine's proof can be used to intuitionistically derive crucial mathematical results, which were supposed to be purely classical up to now: the Ultrafilter Theorem in Boolean Algebra Theory, and the Maximal Ideal Theorem in Ring Theory.
Intuitionistic Model Theory
We have first to explain what we mean by "intuitionistic proof of first order classical completeness". Thus, in this section we outline an intuitionistic version of first order model theory, following the ideas in [1] . At the end of this section we will be able to state Krivine's result, namely, the first goal of this paper.
Let L be a first order countable language over some subset of the set
{∀, →, ⊥, ¬, &, ∨, ∃}
of the first order connectives. We feel free to use similar denotations for the corresponding metalinguistic connectives. The context will always clarify if we are speaking about a connective of L or about a meta-connective.
is classical, DN is in fact a consequence of being a Tarski structure for ∀, →, ⊥. Tarski did not need the condition on DN in his definition of model. Fix a theory T on the language L. We say that a class K of structures for L, and some extra constants, is complete for T if and only if for all M ∈ K, M A ⇒ T ⊢ A.
Proving Completeness
We are now ready to state Krivine's completeness result. We cannot prove intuitionistically the completeness of Tarksi models for L: this fact was first shown by Gödel and a recent proof can be found in [1] . Krivine shown that:
• we can still prove completeness in the weaker form stating the "every consistent theory has a model";
• we can even prove completeness in its original form, provided we drop the third condition above, that is, provided we accept one model more, the all-true model M 0 .
1
Classically, the notion of validity, that is, being true in all models, does not change by adding M 0 , because this extra model adds no extra condition on a formula since it satisfies everything. Thus, we can intuitionistically prove derivability ⇔ validity for a notion of validity classically equivalent, and intuitionistically very close, to the original one proposed by Tarski.
The intuitionistic Completeness Proof
In this section we re-organize the proof of Krivine's completeness result, in order to stress the principle it relies on. We need to define formally some well-known concepts. We first sum up some trivialities about the ⊥ constant and negation. Consistency, that is, M ⊥, can be written as (M ⊥) ⇒ false, and it is nothing but ⊥-soundness. On the other hand, ⊥-completeness means false ⇒ M ⊥, and it always holds. Any classical theory satisfies intuitionistic ⊥-rule, that is, if it is inconsistent then it derives all formulas.
By ¬A, we will mean the standard definition of ¬A in our language. For instance, with the set {∀, →, ⊥} of connectives we fixed, we set ¬A ≡ (A → ⊥). If M A, then M trivially satisfies meta-DN and completeness for A. Any inconsistent (all-true) structure satisfies trivially meta-DN and completeness.
We can think of completeness as a kind of meta-linguistic excluded middle for M. Classically, meta-DN for a closed A, and completeness for A amount to the same for any classical theory. Indeed, if M is inconsistent then it is an all-true structure. Thus, M is both meta-DN and complete for any closed A. On the other hand, if M is consistent, then meta-DN for A means that if ¬A does not hold in M, then A does; that is, classically, either ¬A or A hold in M.
The key property in Gödel's classical completeness proof was: Lemma 2.3 (Gödel's Lemma) Let T be any classical theory and A any closed formula. Then 1. there is a classical theory T ′ extending T , complete for A, that is, deciding A, and equiconsistent with T .
being complete for A is a monotonic property, that is, if T is complete for
A and T ′ extends T , then T ′ is complete for A.
Proof (classic)
1. If T derives ¬A, we set T ′ ≡ T . Then T ′ decides A and it is equiconsistent with T . If T does not derive ¬A, we set T ′ ≡ T ∪ {A}. Both T and T ′ = T ∪ {A} are consistent, and T ′ decides A.
Obvious
This lemma is not derivable without double negation since we cannot decide in general whether T derives ¬A. Still, for the intuitionistic counterpart of completeness, that is, meta-DN, Gödel's lemma holds. Switching between completeness for A and meta-DN for A will be enough in order to constructivize Gödel's proof. Lemma 2.4 (meta-DN and monotonicity) Let T be any classical theory and A any closed formula. Then 1. there is a classical theory T ′ extending T , equiconsistent with T and meta-DN for A.
2. being meta-DN for A is a monotonic property for equiconsistent structures.
Proof.
1. Let T ′ be the classical theory with axioms set T 0 defined by:
We have to prove that T ′ is equiconsistent with T and that T ′ satisfies meta-DN for A.
Equiconsistency. By induction over proofs in T
′ , we can prove that each proof in T ′ is either a proof in T , or it is a proof in T ∪ {A}, in which case (T ⊢ ¬A) ⇒ (T ⊢ ⊥) holds. Assume we have a proof of ⊥ in T ′ . Then either we have a proof of ⊥ in T , and we are done, or we have a proof of ⊥ in T ∪ {A}, and [(T ⊢ ¬A) ⇒ (T ⊢ ⊥)] holds. From T ∪ {A} ⊢ ⊥ we get T ⊢ ¬A; from this latter and (T ⊢ ¬A) ⇒ (T ⊢ ⊥) we conclude again T ⊢ ⊥. The rest of the proof works essentially like in Gödel, but for a metalinguistic property saying that for classical theories, being →-complete is equivalent to being meta-DN. Gödel used completeness in place of meta-DN, of course. Lemma 2.6 (Completeness Lemma) For all classical theories T , there is some classical theory U extending T , which is both →-complete and equiconsistent with T .
Proof. Let A 0 , A 1 , A 2 , . . . be the list of closed formulas of L. As Gödel did, we define a sequence T 0 , T 1 , T 2 , . . . of theories, with T 0 = T and U = n∈ω T n . The theory T n+1 is chosen as a theory including T n , equiconsistent with it, and meta-DN for A n . By construction, all theories T n are equiconsistent each other. U is a classical theory because it is union of a chain of classical theories. U, being the union of an equiconsistent family, is equiconsistent with each T n . For each A n , U includes some equiconsistent theory meta-DN for A n . By monotonicity and equiconsistency, U is meta-DN for all A n . U is a classical theory; thus, U is →-complete.
Proof (intuitionistic). For each T , we can constructively define a conservative (hence equiconsistent) extension H of T , having infinitely many new constants, and which is Henkin-complete, that is it contains an Henkin axiom ¬A[c] → ∀x.¬A [x] for each universal formula in L(H). Such a (constructive) proof can be found in any textbook. By the completeness Lemma 2.6, there is some →-complete extension U of H which is equiconsistent with H and hence with T . U is still Henkin-complete since it includes all Henkin axioms in H, and therefore (U ⊢ ∀x.A) if and only if (U ⊢ A[t] for all closed terms t in L(U)). Then U is a Tarski model. Indeed, it is →-complete by construction, ∀-complete because it is an Henkin theory, ⊥-complete because false ⇒ U ⊥ always holds. It is a consistent classical theory, thus it is ∀-sound, →-sound, ⊥-sound (consistent means this), and it enjoys DN.
A note on strong completeness
Strong completeness, that is, K(T ) A if and only if T ⊢ A ("T derives A") can be proved only if we drop the consistency assumption on models of first order logic. In this case, assume K(T )
A in order to prove T ⊢ A (the reverse is trivial). Let T ′ = T ∪ {¬A}. By repeating the construction of the previous theorem, there is a model Classically, what we just proved is nothing but the usual completeness result, because validity over a class of model extended with the all-true model is equivalent with Tarski validity.
About completeness for logical connectives
The model we built is sound and complete for all connectives but disjunction. In fact, it is sound and complete for ∀, →
Our model is not complete for disjunction, otherwise from M A ∨ ¬A we would get M A or M ¬A. The realizer of such constructive result would define a recursive complete extension of the original consistent theory T . When T is Peano Arithmetic, this is in contradiction with Gödel Incompleteness theorem.
The Ultrafilter Theorem
We will try to isolate the constructive principle which makes a constructive proof of completeness possible, with the hope of applying them to other results as well. The main principle we used seems to be that every filter over a countable boolean algebra can be extended to an ultrafilter (we applied it to a classical theory, which is a particular case of boolean algebra). This theorem is wellknown, but it was considered purely classical up to now. Let us spell out the ultrafilter theorem in details. 2. a filter F is consistent if F does not include 0 B , inconsistent when it does. Note that any inconsistent filter is equal to B.
3. a filter F is complete if and only if, for all x ∈ B, if x ∈ F yields F inconsistent then ¬x ∈ F .
two filters F and G are equiconsistent if and only if F is inconsistent if
and only if G is inconsistent.
a filter F is an ultrafilter if and only if F is consistent and complete.
All definitions are taken from classical mathematics, but for completeness for a filter F , which is usually stated as: for all x, either x ∈ F or ¬x ∈ F . The definition we chosen is classically equivalent, but intuitionistically weaker. The fact that it is weaker is essential in order to prove constructively the ultrafilter theorem for countable boolean algebra (it cannot be proved with the original definition).
Theorem 3.2 Let F be any filter over a countable boolean algebra B. Then 1. F can be extended to a complete filter Z equiconsistent with F 2. In particular: if F is consistent filter then it can be extended to an ultrafilter.
Proof (constructive).
1. Let x n be any enumeration of elements of B. Define a filter chain F n , by:
where ↑ (X) denotes the filter generated from X. Note that the set {¬x n | (x n ∈ F n ) ⇒ (F n inconsistent)} is at most a singleton. Our thesis now is that Z ≡ n∈ω F n is complete and equiconsistent with F .
Equiconsistency. We prove first by induction on n that all F n are equiconsistent with F (and hence also one each other). For n = 0 this follows from F 0 = F . Suppose F n be equiconsistent with F . Assume that F n+1 is inconsistent, that is, that (y 1 ∧ . . . ∧ y k ) = 0 B for some y 1 , . . . , y k generators of F n+1 . We have to prove that 0 B is in F n , and hence in F . By induction we can prove that any intersection of generators of F n+1 is either in F n , or it has the shape y ∧ ¬x n for some y ∈ F n . In the first case, 0 B is in F n and we are done. In the latter case we also know that (x n ∈ F n ) ⇒ (F n inconsistent). Now, y ∧ ¬x n = 0 B for some y ∈ F n , therefore we obtain y ≤ ¬¬x n = x n since B is a boolean algebra. But F n is a filter and thus x n is in F n . Thus, by using (x n ∈ F n ) ⇒ (F n inconsistent), we conclude again that F n is inconsistent. Z, being an union of equiconsistent filters, is equiconsistent with each of them.
Completeness. Take any x ∈ B, and assume that (x ∈ Z) ⇒ (Z inconsistent) holds in order to prove that ¬x is in Z. By definition of Z, for some n ∈ ω, we have x = x n . Assume x n ∈ F n . Then x is in Z, since F n ⊆ Z, and hence, by (x ∈ Z) ⇒ (Z inconsistent), Z is inconsistent. By equiconsistency, also F n is inconsistent. We thus obtained (x n ∈ F n ) ⇒ (F n inconsistent) and hence, by definition of F n+1 , we get ¬x n ∈ F n+1 . We conclude that ¬x n , that is ¬x, is in Z, as wished.
2. Let F and Z be as above. If F is consistent, then also Z is: therefore Z is an ultrafilter.
Some reflections from a constructive viewpoint
Consider the case F is consistent. The main limit of the definition of the ultrafilter Z, from a constructive viewpoint, is that, for all x ∈ B, ¬x ∈ Z if and only if x ∈ Z. This means that Z is a non-informative predicate since it is equivalent to a negation. So, if we build any witness w for an assumption of the form a ∈ Z, then w does not depend on a. Thus we wonder if the ultrafilter theorem could be, from a constructive standpoint, no more than a (nice) curiosity. Still, if we are trying to prove constructively that a filter F is inconsistent, to extend it to an ultrafilter could be the right way to do it. This is how Krivine proved constructively completeness for the class of Tarski models plus the all-true model.
Notice that the statement "F is inconsistent" means that 0 B ∈ F . Thus "F is inconsistent" can be an informative statement, in spite of appearances: it can be associated to a witness. In Krivine, inconsistency of the filter associated to the classical theory T ∪ {¬A} carried, in fact, a witness, in form of a syntactic object, that is, a proof of T ∪ {¬A} ⊢ ⊥. From it, a classical first order proof of T ⊢ A could be obtained.
The Maximal Ideal Theorem
Some results, which are in classical logic easy consequences of the ultrafilter theorem for countable boolean algebras, can be constructivized as they are. Some others require more detailed constructions. We will devote this section to an example of the first kind, the maximal ideal theorem for countable rings.
The Maximal Ideal Construction
Let us begin with some definitions about ideals in a ring. An ideal I in a ring A ≡ (A, +, ·, −, 0 A , 1 A ) is any non-empty subset closed under 0 A , opposite, sum, and such that x ∈ I, a ∈ A imply ax ∈ I. Let us call inconsistent any ideal I of A including 1 A , namely I is inconsistent if and only if I = A. Let consistent mean "not inconsistent", that is, not including 1 A . Let equiconsistent for two ideals I and J means (1 A ∈ I) if and only if (1 A ∈ J). Denote by (X) the minimal ideal including a set X, and (I, x) the minimal ideal including an ideal I and x, that is, (I, x) = (I ∪ {x}). The following is a well-known result.
Lemma 4.1 (construction of (X)) If X is any subset of the ring A, then
Proof. Any ideal J including X must include all expressions a 1 y 1 +. . .+a n y k , for any y 1 , . . . , y k ∈ X and a 1 , . . . , a k ∈ A. Moreover {a 1 y 1 +. . .+a k y k | y 1 , . . . , y k ∈ X, a 1 , . . . , a k ∈ A} is an ideal. In fact, it is closed under 0 A , opposite and sum and for all b ∈ A, b(a 1 y 1 + . . . + a n y k ) = ba 1 y 1 + . . . + ba n y k .
Call complete for x any ideal I such that if (I, x) is consistent, then x is in I. Call complete any ideal complete for any x ∈ A. If M is complete, then "we already added to M everything we could, without producing inconsistency". Any inconsistent ideal is trivially complete. Define "maximal ideal" any consistent ideal maximal by inclusion. An ideal M is maximal, that is, complete and consistent, if and only if for all x ∈ A, (M, x) is consistent if and only if x ∈ M . Indeed the implication from left to right is completeness and the one from right to left is consistency. Moreover we can prove that completeness is monotone.
Lemma 4.3 (monotonicity) Let I and J be ideals, with I ⊆ J. Then, for any x ∈ A, if I is complete for x then also J is.
Proof. The condition "(I, x) consistent" is antimonotonic because if (J, x) is consistent, then (I, x), being included in it, is also consistent. The condition "x ∈ I" is obviously monotone. Completeness spells out as "(I, x) consistent yields x ∈ I", with the antimonotonic condition occurring negatively. Thus completeness is a monotonic condition. Proof. We will prove that any ideal I can be extended to a complete one M , equiconsistent with I. Let us define M as follows. Let x n be any enumeration (with possibly repetitions) of A. Define M 0 = I. Suppose now we already defined M n and set M n+1 ≡ (X n+1 ) where
Any element m ′ of M n+1 has the shape a 1 y 1 + . . . + a k y k , with y 1 , . . . , y k ∈ X n+1 . By induction over k, we can prove that either m ′ ∈ M n , or it has the form m + ax n , for some m ∈ M n and a ∈ A; and in the latter case M n+1 = (M n , x n ) and (M n , x n ) is consistent. Moreover we can prove that each M n satisfies both equiconsistency with I and completeness for x n−1 .
Equiconsistency. Assume 1 A ∈ M n . Then either 1 A is in M n , and we are done, or 1 A = m+ ax n for some m ∈ M n and a ∈ A, and M n+1 = (M n , x n ), and (M n , x n ) is consistent. But 1 A = m + a · x n means that (M n , x n ) is inconsistent.
Completeness. M n+1 is complete for x n . Assume (M n+1 , x n ) be consistent. Then (M n , x n ) is consistent by antimonotonicity. Thus, by definition of M n+1 , we conclude x n ∈ M n+1 .
By induction over n, we conclude that all ideals M n are equiconsistent with I. M , being the union of a chain of ideals, is also an ideal. Being the union of a family equiconsistent with I, it is equiconsistent with I. By monotonicity, it is complete over each x n , because it includes M n+1 which is complete over x n .
Thus M is a complete ideal equiconsistent with I.
A note about constructivism
Membership to M is a negated predicate. Thus, also this construction is noninformative. We proved no more than the maximal ideal M exists, and that we can use it in constructive reasoning. From the statement x ∈ M we will get no witness. And no extra information about M is available.
